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  Network neutrality is a vexing issue. Proponents of neutrality regulation argue that the 
free, innovative Internet of today is threatened and government action is needed to protect it. 
Opponents argue that regulation is not needed, or will be flawed in practice, or is a bad idea even 
in principle. 
  
  One of the reasons the network neutrality debate is so murky is that relatively few people 
understand the mechanics of network discrimination. In reasoning about net neutrality it helps to 
understand the technical motivations for discrimination, the various kinds of discrimination and 
how they would actually be put into practice, and what countermeasures would then be available 
to users and regulators. These are what I want to explain in this essay. 
 
  It’s not my goal to answer every question about net neutrality—that would require a book, 
not an essay. What I want to do is fill in some of the technical background in a way that 
illuminates the core issues, in the hope of providing a little clarity to the discussion. 
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Nuts and Bolts of Network Neutrality 
 
Edward W. Felten 
 
I. Intelligence at the Edges vs. in the Middle 
 
  The Internet consists of a set of end-user computers connected by infrastructure that 
carries data between those computers. This infrastructure is basically a set of routers (think: 
metal boxes with electronics inside) connected by links (think: long wires). Packets of data get 
passed from one router to another, via links. A packet is forwarded from router to router, until it 
arrives at its destination.   
  The Internet is unusual among networks in putting most of the intelligence in the 
computers at the edge of the network, rather than in the infrastructure at the heart of the network. 
The routers in the middle forward packets with only minor processing—all the heavy lifting 
takes place on the transmitting and receiving computers. This approach of putting intelligence at 
the edge of the network is known as the end-to-end principle, and it is one of the keys to the 
Internet’s success thus far.   
  Putting the intelligence in the edge computers has several advantages. (1) Edge 
computers account for most of the devices involved in the network, so the edge computers 
collectively have most of the memory and processing power available to the network, and it 
makes sense to put the intelligence where these resources are available. (2) Edge computers have 
a better idea what the network’s users want, because they are owned and controlled directly by 
users. (3) Innovation usually happens faster at the edge of the network.   
  In a sense, the net neutrality debate is a fight between the edges and the middle over 
control of the network. Neutrality regulation is generally supported by companies that provide 
services at the edge of the network, and is generally opposed by companies that manage the 
middle of the network. Each group wants the part of the network that it controls to have most of 
the intelligence, because more opportunities to innovate—and profit from innovation—are 
available to those who control the intelligent parts of the network.   





II. Minimal vs. Non-minimal Discrimination 
 
  Focus now on a single router (in the “middle” of the network). It has several incoming 
links on which packets arrive, and several outgoing links on which it can send packets. When a 
packet shows up on an incoming link, the router determines on which outgoing link the packet 
should be forwarded. If that outgoing link is available, the packet can be sent out on it 
immediately. But if the outgoing link is busy transmitting another packet, the newly arrived 
packet will have to wait—it will be “buffered” in the router’s memory, waiting its turn until the 
outgoing link is free. 
  Buffering lets the router deal with temporary surges in traffic. But if packets keep 
showing up faster than they can be sent out on some outgoing link, the number of buffered 
packets will grow and grow, and eventually the router will run out of buffer memory. At that 
point, if one more packet shows up, the router has no choice but to discard a packet. It can 
discard the newly arriving packet, or it can make room for the new packet by discarding an older 
packet waiting in the buffer, but something has to be discarded.
1   
  When a router is forced to discard a packet, it can discard any packet it likes. One 
possibility is to assign priorities to the packets, and always discard the packet with lowest 
priority. This mechanism defines one type of network discrimination, which prioritizes packets 
and discards low-priority packets first, but only discards packets when that is absolutely 
necessary. I’ll call it minimal discrimination, because it only discriminates when it can’t serve 
everybody. With minimal discrimination, if the network is not crowded, lots of low-priority 
packets can get through. Only when there is an unavoidable conflict with high-priority packets is 
a low-priority packet inconvenienced.   
  In contrast, there is another, more drastic form of discrimination, in which routers discard 
some low-priority packets even when it is possible to forward or deliver every packet. A router 
might, for example, limit low-priority packets to 20% of the network’s capacity, even if part of 
the other 80% is idle. I’ll call this non-minimal discrimination. One of the basic questions to ask 
about any network discrimination regime is whether it is minimal or non-minimal in this sense, 
and one of the basic questions to ask about any rule limiting discrimination is how it applies to 
                                                           
1 This is an illustration of the “best effort” principle, one of the clever engineering decisions that make the Internet 
feasible.  The Internet will do its best to deliver each packet promptly, but it doesn’t make any guarantees.  It’s up to 
software on the end computers to detect dropped packets and recover.  Your computer’s software can, and probably 
often does, recover from dropped packets. 3 
minimal versus non-minimal discrimination. We can imagine a policy, for example, that allows 
minimal discrimination but limits or bans non-minimal discrimination.   
  This distinction matters, I think, because minimal and non-minimal discrimination are 
supported by different arguments. Minimal discrimination sometimes may be an engineering 
necessity due to the finite speed of network links, but non-minimal discrimination is never 
technologically necessary—it makes service worse for low-priority packets, but doesn’t help 
high-priority packets. Non-minimal discrimination can only be justified by a more complicated 
economic argument, for example that non-minimal discrimination allows forms of price 
discrimination that increase social welfare; vague arguments that network operators have to 
reserve some fraction of capacity for some purpose won’t cut it. 
Take-home lesson: Discrimination has harsher and milder forms.  Blocking a packet is 
harsher than just lowering its priority. 
 
 
III. Delay Discrimination 
 
 Discrimination  doesn’t  have to operate by dropping packets.  It can also work by 
reordering packets.  
  Recall that packets sometimes have to be buffered (i.e., to wait) at a router if they need to 
be sent over an outgoing network link that is busy. When an outgoing link becomes available, 
there may be several buffered packets that are waiting to be transmitted on that link. You might 
expect the router to send the packet that has been waiting the longest—a first-come, first-served 
rule. Often that is what happens, but the Internet Protocol doesn’t require routers to forward 
packets in any particular order. In principle a router can choose any packet it likes to forward 
next. This suggests an obvious mechanism for discriminating between two categories of traffic: a 
network provider can program its routers to always forward high-priority packets before low-
priority packets. Low-priority packets feel this discrimination as an extra delay in passing 
through the network.   
  The distinction between minimal and non-minimal discrimination applies here too. A 
minimal form of delay discrimination only delays low-priority packets when it is necessary to 
delay some packet—for example when multiple packets are waiting for a link that can only 
transmit one packet at a time. There is also a non-minimal form of delay discrimination in which 
a low-priority packet may be delayed even when the link it needs is available. As before, a net 4 
neutrality rule might want to treat minimal and non-minimal delay discrimination differently.  
  One interesting consequence of minimal delay discrimination is that it hurts some 
applications more than others. Internet traffic is usually bursty, with periods of relatively low 
activity punctuated by occasional bursts of packets. When you browse the Web, for example, 
you generate little or no traffic while you’re reading a page, but there is a burst of traffic when 
your browser needs to fetch a new page from a server. If a network provider is using minimal 
delay discrimination, and the high-priority traffic is bursty, then low-priority traffic will usually 
sail through the network with little delay, but will experience noticeable delay whenever there is 
a burst of high-priority traffic. The technical term for this kind of on-again, off-again delay is 
“jitter.”   
  Some applications can handle jitter with no problem. If you’re downloading a large file, 
you care more about the average packet arrival rate (the download speed) than about when any 
particular packet arrives. If you’re browsing the web, modest jitter will cause, at worst, a slight 
delay in downloading some pages. If you’re watching a streaming video, your player will buffer 
the stream so jitter won’t bother you much. On the other hand, applications like online gaming or 
Internet telephony (VoIP), which rely on steady streaming of interactive, realtime 
communication, can suffer a lot if there is jitter. Users report that VoIP services like Vonage and 
Skype can become unusable when subjected to network jitter.   
  Since residential Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are often phone companies, or at least 
offer home phone service, they may have a special incentive to discriminate against competing 
Internet phone services. Causing jitter for such services, whether by minimal or non-minimal 
delay discrimination, could be an effective tactic for an ISP that wants to drive customers away 
from independent Internet telephone services. 
Take-home lesson: Discrimination hurts some applications more than others.  VoIP 
services are especially vulnerable to discrimination. 
 
 
IV. Detecting Discrimination 
 
The kinds of discrimination I have just described will often be experienced by users as 
decreased network performance. However, as the following hypothetical example illustrates, it is 
often difficult to distinguish between performance problems resulting from undesirable forms of 
discrimination and ones due to other causes.   5 
Suppose we discover that customers of TelCo, a residential ISP, are having trouble using 
the VoipCo Internet phone service, because of jitter problems. What might be causing this? One 
possibility is that TelCo is using delay discrimination, either minimal or non-minimal, with the 
goal of causing this problem. Many people would want rules against this kind of behavior.   
Another possibility is that TelCo isn’t trying to cause problems for VoipCo users, and in 
fact TelCo’s management of its network is completely reasonable and nondiscriminatory, but for 
reasons beyond TelCo’s control its network happens to have higher jitter than other networks 
have. Perhaps the jitter problems are temporary. In this case, most people would agree that net 
neutrality rules shouldn’t punish TelCo for something that isn’t really its fault.   
The most challenging possibility, from a policy standpoint, is that TelCo didn’t take any 
obvious steps to cause the problem but is happy that it exists, and is subtly managing its network 
in a way that fosters jitter. Network management is complicated, and many management 
decisions could impact jitter one way or the other. A network provider who wants to cause high 
jitter can do so, and might have pretextual excuses for all of the steps it takes. Can regulators 
distinguish this kind of stratagem from the case of fair and justified engineering decisions that 
happen to cause a little temporary jitter?   
Surely some discriminatory strategies are so obvious, and the offered engineering 
pretexts so weak, that we could block or punish them without worrying about being wrong. But 
there would be hard cases too. Net neutrality regulation, even if justified, will inevitably lead to 
some difficult line-drawing.   
There is a useful analogy to employment discrimination.
2 Company A might say, “We 
won’t hire women.” Company B might say (falsely) that it is perfectly willing to hire a woman if 
she is the best-qualified candidate, but might in fact seek out reasons not to hire a woman in 
every particular case. Company C might have no intention of discriminating but might follow 
policies that have the unintended side effect of causing fewer women to be hired. Company D 
might have adopted those same policies with the intent of discriminating. Company E might 
behave in an entirely fair and evenhanded way but have relatively few women on its payroll due 
to chance or other factors beyond its control. The blatant discrimination of Company A is easy to 
detect and address, but it could be difficult in practice to tell Companies B, C, D, and E apart. An 
                                                           
2 In making this analogy, I’m not claiming any kind of moral equivalence between employment discrimination and 
network discrimination.  That would be silly—packets are not people.  The point of the analogy is simply that anti-
discrimination rules raise difficult enforcement issues. 6 
enforcement regime that tries to distinguish them will be costly and will make some errors. This 
does not necessarily tell us not to establish such an enforcement regime, but it does give us 
reason to think carefully before doing so.  
Take-home lesson: Anti-discrimination rules can be hard to write, and hard to enforce. 
 
V. Discrimination, Congestion, and Cooperation 
 
   Let’s turn now to how the Internet responds to congestion, and how network 
discrimination might affect that response. I described previously how network 
congestion causes Internet routers to discard some data packets. Every dropped packet 
has some computer at the edge of the network waiting for it. Eventually the waiting 
computer and its communication partner will figure out that the packet must have been 
dropped, and from this they will deduce that the network is congested. So they will re-
send the dropped packet, but in response to the probable congestion they will slow 
down the rate at which they transmit data. Once enough packets are dropped, and 
enough computers slow down their packet transmission, the congestion will clear up.  
  This is a very indirect way of coping with congestion—drop packets, wait for 
endpoint computers to notice the missing packets, and respond by slowing down—but 
it works pretty well. One interesting aspect of this system is that it is voluntary—the 
system relies on endpoint computers to slow down when they see congestion, but 
nothing forces them to do so. We can think of this as a kind of deal between endpoint 
computers, in which each one promises to slow down if its packets are dropped. 
(Notice that this is another application of the end-to-end principle we discussed 
earlier.)   
   But there is an incentive to defect from this deal. Suppose that you defect—when 
your packets are dropped you keep on sending packets as fast as you can—but 
everybody else keeps the deal. When your packets are dropped, the congestion will 
continue. Then other people’s packets will be dropped, until enough of those people 
slow down and the congestion eases. By ignoring the congestion signals you are getting 
more than your fair share of the network resources.   7 
   Despite the incentive to defect, most people keep the deal by using networking 
software that slows down as expected in response to congestion. Why is this? One way 
to look at it is that there is a sort of social contract by which users cooperate with their 
peers, and software vendors cooperate by writing software that causes users to keep the 
deal.   
   One of the reasons users comply, I think, is a sense of fairness. If I believe that 
the burdens of congestion control fall about equally on everybody, at least in the long 
run, then it seems fair to me to slow down my own transmissions when my turn comes. 
One time I might be the one whose packets get dropped, so I will slow down. Another 
time, by chance, somebody else’s packets may be dropped, so it will be their turn to 
slow down. Everybody gets their turn.
3
   But now suppose that the network starts singling out some people and dropping 
their packets first. Now the burden of congestion control falls heavily on them—they 
have to slow down and others can just keep going. Suddenly the I’ll-slow-down-if-you-
do deal doesn’t seem so fair, and the designated victims are more likely to defect from 
the deal and just keep sending data even when the network tells them to slow down.  
  The implications for network discrimination are clear. If the network 
discriminates by sending misleading signals about congestion, and sending them 
preferentially to certain machines or certain applications, the incentive for those 
machines and applications to stick to the social contract and do their share to control 
congestion will weaken. Will this lead to a wave of defections that destroys the Net? 
Probably not, but I can’t be sure. I do think this is something we should think about.  
  We should also listen to the broader lesson of this analysis. If the network 
discriminates, users and applications will react by changing their behavior. 




                                                           
3 I’m not claiming that the average user has thought through these issues carefully.  But many software providers 
have made decisions about what to do, and those decisions factor in users’ wants and needs.  Software developers 
act as proxies for users in making these decisions. 8 
VI. Encryption as a Countermeasure 
 
   Scenarios for network discrimination typically involve an ISP that looks at users’ 
traffic and imposes delays or other performance penalties on certain types of traffic. To 
do this, the ISP must be able to tell the targeted data packets apart from ordinary 
packets. For example, to penalize VoIP traffic, the ISP will want to distinguish VoIP 
packets from ordinary packets.   
    Normally, the ISP can distinguish VoIP packets by looking for characteristic 
values at certain places in the packet. One way for users to fight back is to encrypt 
their packets, on the theory that encrypted packets will all look like gibberish to the 
ISP, so the ISP won’t be able to tell one type of packet from another.   
    To do this, the user would probably use a Virtual Private Network (VPN). 
Whenever the user’s computer wanted to send a packet, it would encrypt that packet 
and then send the encrypted packet to a “gateway” computer that was outside the ISP’s 
network. The gateway computer would then decrypt the packet and send it on to its 
intended destination. Incoming packets would follow the same path in reverse—they 
would be sent to the gateway, where they would be encrypted and forwarded on to the 
user’s computer. The ISP would see nothing but a bi-directional stream of packets, all 
encrypted, flowing between the user’s computer and the gateway.   
   The most the user can hope for from a VPN is to force the ISP to handle all of 
the user’s packets in the same way. The ISP can still penalize all of the user’s packets, 
or it can single out randomly chosen packets for special treatment, but those are the 
only forms of discrimination available to it. The VPN has some cost—packets must be 
encrypted, decrypted, and forwarded—but the user might consider the cost worthwhile 
if it stops the ISP’s network discrimination.   
   (In practice, things are a bit more complicated. The ISP might be able to infer 
which packets are which by observing the size and timing of packets. For example, a 
sequence of packets, all of a certain size and flowing with metronome-like regularity in 
both directions, is probably a voice conversation. The user might use countermeasures, 
such as altering the size and timing of packets, but that can be costly too. To simplify 9 
our discussion, let’s pretend that the VPN gives the ISP no way to distinguish packets 
from each other.)   
   The VPN user and the ISP are playing an interesting game of chicken. The ISP 
wants to discriminate against some of the user’s packets, but doesn’t want to 
inconvenience the user so badly that the user discontinues the service (or demands a 
much lower price). The user responds by making his packets indistinguishable and 
daring the ISP to discriminate against all of them. The ISP can back down, by easing 
off on discrimination in order to keep the user happy—or the ISP can call the user’s 
bluff and hamper all or most of the user’s traffic.   
   But the ISP can use a different and more effective strategy. If the ISP wants to 
hamper a particular application, and there is a way to manipulate the user’s traffic that 
affects that application much more than it does other applications, then the ISP has a 
way to punish the targeted application. Recall from earlier that VoIP is especially 
sensitive to jitter (unpredictable changes in delay), but most other applications can 
tolerate jitter without much trouble. If the ISP imposes jitter on all of the user’s 
packets, the result will be a big problem for VoIP services, but will not have much 
impact on other applications.   
   Attempts by ISPs to discriminate, and by users to evade discrimination, lead to a 
technical battle of measure and countermeasure that can have harmful effects. 
Resources are wasted, on both sides, and collateral damage is possible. Consider the 
example above, where an ISP blocks or degrades encrypted traffic, in order to keep 
customers from using encryption to evade the ISP’s packet classifiers. In doing this, 
the ISP is effectively imposing a performance tax on the use of encryption. This will 
cause users to encrypt less, which will put their security and privacy at risk. After all, 
any packet that can be inspected by the ISP can also be inspected by an intruder. 
Take-home lesson: Technical countermeasures, such as encryption, cannot fully shield 





VII. Quality of Service 
 
   One of the standard arguments against network neutrality rules is that network 
providers need to provide Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees to certain kinds of 
traffic, such as video. If QoS is necessary, the argument goes, and if net neutrality 
rules would hamper QoS by requiring all traffic to be treated the same, then net 
neutrality rules must be harmful. In this section, I want to unpack this reasoning and 
see how it holds up in light of computer science research and engineering experience.  
  First, I need to make clear that guaranteeing QoS for an application means more 
than just giving it lots of bandwidth or prioritizing its traffic above other applications. 
Those things might be helpful, but they’re not QoS (or at least not the kind I’m talking 
about here). What QoS mechanisms (try to) do is to make specific performance 
guarantees to an application over a short window of time—in other words, they want 
not just good performance on average, but performance that is smooth and predictable. 
  An example may clarify this point. As discussed above, some applications are 
more sensitive to jitter than others. If you’re loading a web page, and your network 
connection hiccups so that you get no traffic for (say) half a second, you may notice a 
short pause but it won’t be a big deal. But if you’re having a voice conversation with 
somebody, a half-second gap will be very annoying. Web browsing needs decent 
bandwidth on average, but voice conversations needs better protection against short 
delays. That protection is QoS.   
    The reason we don’t need special QoS mechanisms for browsing is that the 
broadband Internet already provides performance that is almost always steady enough 
over the time intervals that matter for browsing. Sometimes, too, there are simple tricks 
that can turn an application that cares about short delays into one that cares only about 
longer delays. For example, watching prerecorded audio or video streams doesn’t need 
QoS, because you can use buffering. If you’re watching a video, you can download 
every frame ten seconds before you’re going to watch it; then a hiccup of a few 
seconds won’t be a problem. This is why streaming audio and video work perfectly 
well today (when there is enough average bandwidth).   11 
    There are two other important cases where QoS isn’t needed. First, if an 
application needs higher average speed than the Net can provide, than QoS won’t help 
it—QoS makes the Net’s speed steadier but not faster. Second—and less obvious—if 
an app needs much less average speed than the Net can provide, then QoS might also 
be unnecessary. If speed doesn’t drop entirely to zero but fluctuates, with peaks and 
valleys, then even the valleys may be high enough to give the application what it 
needs. This is starting to happen for voice conversations—many VoIP systems seem to 
work pretty well without any special QoS support in the network.   
   We can’t say that QoS is never needed, but experience does teach that it’s easy, 
especially for non-experts, to overestimate the importance of QoS. That’s why I’m not 
convinced—though I could be, with more evidence—that QoS is a strong argument 
against net neutrality rules. 
Take-home lesson: Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees are less important than you 
might think. 
 
VIII. Should We Adopt a Network Neutrality Policy? 
 
   Readers looking here for a simple policy prescription will be disappointed. The 
network neutrality issue is more complex and subtle than most of the advocates on 
either side would have you believe. Net neutrality advocates are right to worry that 
ISPs can discriminate—and have the means and motive to do so—in ways that might be 
difficult to stop. Opponents are right to say that enforcing neutrality rules may be 
difficult and error-prone. Both sides are right to say that making the wrong decision 
can lead to unintended side-effects and hamper the Internet’s development.   
    There is a good policy argument in favor of doing nothing and letting the 
situation develop further. The present situation, with the network neutrality issue on 
the table in Washington but no rules yet adopted, is in many ways ideal. ISPs, knowing 
that discriminating now would make regulation seem more necessary, are on their best 
behavior; and with no rules yet adopted we don’t have to face the difficult issues of 
line-drawing and enforcement. Enacting strong regulation now would risk side-effects, 
and passing toothless regulation now would remove the threat of regulation. If it is 12 
possible to maintain the threat of regulation while leaving the issue unresolved, time 
will teach us more about what regulation, if any, is needed. 
 
 